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Abstract
Scholars oen use voting data to estimate central bankers’ policy preferences
but consensus voting is commonplace. To get around this, we combine topic-based
text analysis and scaling methods to generate theoretically motivated comparative
measures of central bank preferences on the U.S. Federal Open Market Commiee
leading up to the nancial crisis in a way that does not depend on voting behavior.
We apply these measures to a number of applications in the literature. For exam-
ple, we nd that FOMC members that are Federal Reserve Bank Presidents from
districts experiencing higher unemployment are also more likely to emphasize un-
employment in their speech. We also conrm that commiee members on schedule
to vote are more likely to express consensus opinion than their o schedule voting
counterparts.
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Political economists have long studied the role of central banks and central bankers
in the governance structure of modern countries. Despite their specialty, central banks
share similarities with many other political institutions. For example, in the U.S., a
small commiee of individuals set interest rate policy according to majority rule. Be-
cause central bank commiees oen take “roll call” votes during commiee meetings
like in legislatures, researchers commonly apply spatial voting models to help under-
stand central bank decision making. With informative voting, researchers can locate
central bankers on a single common dimension, based on the correlations in their vot-
ing behavior (see for e.g. Chappell et al., 2000; Chang, 2003; Gerlach-Kristen and Meade,
2010; Hix et al., 2010; Adolph, 2013; Eijnger et al., 2017; Ainsley, 2017).
Previous research has presented some possible problems with applying spatial vot-
ing models to central bank decision making. First, commiee members oen vote ac-
cording to consensus and consensus voting seems to describe most central bank pol-
icy outputs irrespective of how the commiee is organized; this makes computation of
members’ preferences dicult because of invariant or sparse data (Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia, 2010). Second, the status of commiee members, such as duration of tenure on
the commiee, whether the member is appointed by the president or elected by his or
her district, and whether a member has dissented before, is shown to predict whether a
member will dissent or not (Meade and Sheets, 2005a; Meade, 2005); this makes it hard
to distinguish members’ preferences from member hierarchy. Worse, any willingness
to cast a dissenting vote is made harder by a dominant commiee Chair (Crawford and
Haller, 1990; Shapiro and Varian, 2013) as well as tendencies towards “group-think” due
to members’ socialization, such as education and vocation, that may lead members to
draw similar conclusions (Johnson, 2016; Kaplan, 2017; Hallerberg and Wehner, 2018).
In short, sparse data and dierences across individuals in their ability and willingness to
dissent makes spatial methods designed for estimating preferences from roll-call votes
particularly challenging for studying central banking.
Instead of using voting data to estimate commiee members’ relative preferences,
we use a method that combines topic modeling and positional analysis based on a textual
interpretation of a theoretical model called the Taylor rule. We use Federal Open Mar-
ket Commiee (FOMC) meeting transcripts between 2005 and 2008 to estimate commit-
tee members’ preferences using the relative emphasis on policy topics that U.S. central
bankers are mandated to consider: ination and unemployment/output.
Our main contribution is to provide a strategy for estimating central bankers’ pref-
erences using what policymakers say in meetings rather than how they vote in roll
calls. Instead of using real time economic data such as commiee members’ economic
forecasts to infer relative emphasis (El-Shagi and Jung, 2015), we compute relative po-
sitions by using how much a member emphasizes ination relative to output and un-
employment in a policy meeting. Methodologically, our approach highlights the value
in explicitly including speech data and human judgment to assist in the interpretation
of unsupervised learning approaches increasingly common in political science (see also
Roberts et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2015). An unusual aspect of our application is to lever-
age common understanding of the micro-foundations of FOMC deliberation, enshrined
in the Fed’s dual mandate, to focus an unsupervised and oen hard to interpret machine
learning model (Chang et al., 2009).
Our results have several important implications for the politics of commiee decision-
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making and political economy. First, we show that despite their consensus voting, cen-
tral bankers express much larger variation in policy positions in speech than they do in
votes. is is important as a shi in FOMC preferences has important implications not
only for the U.S. economy and its citizens, but, due to the prominence of the U.S. in the
global nancial system, that can dramatically shape international markets as well. Sec-
ond, the fact that we nd greater variation in speech data than in voting data speaks to
the similarity that central bank commiees have with other political institutions. Our
ndings add to mounting evidence in other contexts, such as legislatures and politi-
cal parties, where political actors similarly express greater diversity in speech opinions
than they do in formal voting behavior (Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Schwarz et al., 2017).
ird, market actors increasingly use speech data to forecast future FOMC behavior.
CNN, for example, recently reported that Minutes from the Federal Open Market Com-
miee meeting in September show that a December interest rate hike is likely, providing
qualitative analysis of commiee members’ ination preferences derived from commit-
tee meeting minutes. As markets increasingly turn to what members say in addition to
how they vote, the need to understand similarities and dierences in members’ revealed
preferences during policy deliberations is all the more pressing.1
1 Central Bank Preferences
e individuals who sit on the FOMC are mandated by the U.S. Congress to fulll three
goals: maximize employment, stabilize prices, and keep long-term interest rates steady.
Although all members on the FOMC share the same mandate, commiee members have
dierent preferences. A useful ranking of central bank preferences is based on their in-
ation preferences – or how sensitive policymakers are to increases in ination risks.
Borrowing terms used to describe individuals’ appetites for war, those that worry rel-
atively more about ination risks are called Ination Hawks whereas those that worry
relatively less about ination risks are called Ination Doves. Ordering individual cen-
tral bank commiee members according to their preferences along a single common
dimension, “how much do I care about ination risks relative to output and unemploy-
ment risks,” is important as it allows researchers to compare preferences across actors
and over time and to test theories about commiee decision-making. Indeed members
themselves talk about ination this way: in January 31 2007, Bank President Geithner
(New York) reported his ination concern strictly using such terms, “We see somewhat
less downside risk to growth and somewhat less upside risk to ination than we did,
but the overall balance of risks in our view is still weighted toward ination.” e fact
that commiee members have such a mandate and talk in these terms provides an un-
usual theoretical consensus on a low dimensional structure to understand members’
preferences over a wide variety of apparently disparate policy topics.2
1 Je Cox, ”Fed minutes: December rate hike all but certain despite low ination,” CNBC, October 11,
2017
2Unlike most legislative scaling applications there are both substantive as well as statistical reasons
for selecting a single dimension, and agreement about what the dimension represents. For discussion on
the statistical benets of low-dimensionality, see Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Martin and inn (2002);
and Clinton et al. (2004). For a paper that treats estimation when dimensionality is higher, see Lauderdale
and Clark (2014).
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If members of the FOMC are all tasked with the same objective, why would cen-
tral bankers have dierent preferences? First, a member’s characteristics may aect
their appetite for ination, such as who appoints them (Chang, 2003; Meade and Sheets,
2005a; Chappell Jr et al., 1993; Chappell et al., 1995; Havrilesky and Gildea, 1991, 1995;
Tootell, 1996) and their educational training (Hallerberg and Wehner, 2018; Kaplan,
2017; Johnson, 2016). Second, central bankers have their own career histories, goals, and
objectives (Havrilesky and Gildea, 1991; Eichler and La¨hner, 2014; Adolph, 2013) and we
expect their career incentives to inuence their policymaking. Inter-commiee politics
may also aect their behavior. Schonhardt-Bailey (2013) shows that hallway conversa-
tions as well as explicit deliberation allows central bankers to inuence and persuade
their colleagues. Finally, gender may also play a role with female members holding more
Hawkish preferences than their male counterparts (Diouf and Pe´pin, 2017).
Previous measures of central bank preferences predominately depended on analyz-
ing voting behavior (see for e.g., Chappell, Havrilesky, and Roy McGregor, 2000; Chang,
2003; Gerlach-Kristen and Meade, 2010; Hix, Høyland, and Vivyan, 2010; Adolph, 2013;
Eijnger, Mahieu, and Raes, 2017; Ainsley, 2017; Bennani, Farvaque, and Stanek, 2018).
Following the roll call voting literature (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Carroll et al., 2009;
Clinton et al., 2004), scholars use commiee votes to help infer commiee members’
policy preferences. For example, Chappell et al. estimate monetary policy reaction func-
tions for individual FOMC members using expressed preferences in the transcripts as
their data source. ese authors code member preferences into three categories: favor-
ing interest rate tightening, favoring interest rate easing, or consenting to the proposed
policy rate (Chappell et al., 2000, 72).
However, while it seems natural to characterize central bankers as ination “Hawks”
who vote in favor of interest rate tightening and “Doves” who vote for loosening, this
behavior may be a beer measure of whether and to what extent policymakers coor-
dinate, rather than their preference similarity or dissimilarity (Schelling, 1978). is is
especially likely because in central bank decision-making, public consensus outcomes
are partly determined by actors’ desire to minimize apparent divergences of opinion
to avoid economic uncertainty and to stabilize expectations (Woodford, 2005; Rosa and
Verga, 2007). Similarly, members willingness to cooperate oen depends on others in
the group and especially on the willingness of the commiee Chair to allow for pub-
lic dissent in the rst place (Crawford and Haller, 1990; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2010;
Shapiro and Varian, 2013).
Consequently, we observe very lile variation in central bank voting behavior, which
makes identifying individual commiee member preferences statistically challenging.
is is especially so in the United States. For example, between 1948 and 2014, FOMC
members cast on average only one dissenting vote per meeting, which is less than 10
percent of all votes cast (ornton and Wheelock, 2014). Between 2005 to 2008, the pe-
riod that we consider in this paper, there were just seven ocial dissenting votes out of
255 ocial roll call votes, about two percent of all votes cast. Finally, dissenting votes
are also only cast by a select subset of the commiee members. Indeed one member,
Bank President Lacker (Richmond), cast four out of the seven dissenting votes between
2005 and 2008. Figure 1 shows the small number of dissents over the period we examine
in this paper, demonstrating lile variation to actually estimate preferences. For those
cases where there is enough variation to estimate members’ preferences, or for those
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cases where members’ expressed preferences in deliberations prior to the roll call are
used to supplement the data, the recovered estimates arguably remain sensitive to in-
formation provided by those rare events where the commiee member dissents. us,
while each commiee member has the right to vote according to his or her own prefer-
ences (or the preferences of his/her underlying constituency), ocial central bank de-
cision making, at least as it is reported by ocial voting, most oen conrms the status
quo policy rate and likely reects policy coordination as well as commiee members’
preferences.3
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Figure 1: Voting on the FOMC between 2005 and 2008
One solution to this problem is to compute a measure of implied dissents in speech
and add this data to observed dissents in votes. Using supplemental information from
meeting transcripts, it is possible to identify those cases where members express dissent
in the meeting deliberations but refrain from doing so ocially when the actual roll call
vote is cast (Chappell et al., 2000; Eijnger et al., 2017; El-Shagi and Jung, 2015). With
the inclusion of more cases, this measurement strategy leads to a greater numbers of
dissents and relaxes some of the problems associated with sparse data. Unfortunately,
however, this approach brings up new theoretical and measurement questions. First,
why do some members dissent in speech but not in votes? Second, are dissents in speech
and dissents in votes the same? For example, if a member is willing to dissent both in
speech and in votes and another is only willing to express dissent in speech, is the rst
member relatively more extreme in position location or in position intensity or in both?
Do dissents in speech predict future dissenting voting behavior or are members’ speech
and voting behaviors independent?
3Commiee members most oen vote to maintain rather than increase or decrease interest rates, and
conventional policy moves are oen restricted to 25 basis points byway of norms.
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To avoid such problems with vote data, we construct estimates for FOMC members
by using a relative-position, textual interpretation of interest rate policy-seing based
on a monetary policy rule called the “Taylor rule.” If central bankers’ policy decisions
are based on an expressed trade-o between higher values of ination and lower values
of unemployment/output, then we can use the relative amount of time central bankers
spend talking about each topic to develop measures of FOMC members’ preferences.
As a rst step, we measure topics using a version of Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) augmented to capture topical phrases as well as single words. We then apply
human judgment to identify only those topics that policymakers are mandated to care
about (ination, unemployment/output). Finally, we use the expressed topic mentions
of ination and output and unemployment to scale actors’ relative positions on a sin-
gle dimension measuring ination aversion. While other scholars have applied topic
models, or similar approaches, using FOMC transcript data, to our knowledge, this pa-
per is the rst to start from a theoretical model of topic emphasis and then to combine
the results from expressed topic emphasis with scaling models common in the political
science literature.4
2 Estimating Central Bank Preferences
e Taylor rule is a simple approximation or guideline for what central bankers ought
to do given changes in the economy developed by Stanford economist John Taylor. e
original rule provides an aggregate policy recommendation for changing the federal
funds rate as output and ination change over time (Taylor, 1993). Importantly, the
Taylor rule represents an explicit reaction function for the monetary policy commiee;
it shows how the federal funds rate should change in a response to changes in ination
(deviations from target) and changes in output (the output gap).5
r = pi +
1
2
(y) +
1
2
(pi − 2) + 2, (1)
e outcome variable r is the desired federal funds rate, pi is the rate of ination
over the previous four quarters, and y is the percent deviation of real GDP to target
GDP. We assume that members are stating their beliefs about forward ination and
output/unemployment in their speeches, and that the topics members emphasize are
consistent with their preferences, because they are all using something resembling the
Taylor rule to guide them.
Importantly, the Taylor rule, or some derivation of the Taylor rule, is used as a guide-
line in most central banks around the world. e Board of Governors and the research
sta at regional Federal Reserve Banks consult with FOMC members about projections
from Taylor rule estimates and policymakers are equipped with economic projections
from dierent Taylor rule specications. For example, Appendix B in the 2008 “Blue-
book” presents six scenarios of the future economy, three of which are based on some
4Previous work by Schonhardt-Bailey (2013); Acosta and Meade (2015) models commiee member
rhetoric using related exploratory scaling models. Our approach is distinguished by a theoretically mo-
tivated conrmatory rather than an unsupervised exploratory approach.
5For the rest of the paper we refer to output/unemployment so as to capture either the Taylor rule or
the Phillips Curve, which models this trade-o according to unemployment.
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derivative of the Taylor rule.6 Even when there is uncertainty about the true model of
the economy, the Taylor rule is expected to deliver good outcomes in a variety of mod-
els. A version of the Taylor rule has been used, for example, to estimate interest rate
decisions by the ECB’s Governing Council (Hayo and Me´on, 2013) and in the United
States (Plosser, 2014; Blinder et al., 2005).
In addition to the theoretical and empirical evidence, and as aforementioned, policy-
makers themselves talk about unemployment/output and ination in Taylor rule terms
whilst deliberating over monetary policy. For example, in one meeting on December
11, 2007, Board Governor Kroszner explained that “each incremental step we take with
respect to policy easing potentially has higher and higher costs with respect to ination.
ere are no free lunches here.” Similarly, even for those cases when the Taylor rule is
not used explicitly, members still use these two topics to anchor their thinking. Board
Governor Gramlich on June 30, 2005 notes, “We don’t necessarily follow the explicit
Taylor rule outcomes of the Bluebook but we look at ination and unemployment and
try to make them hit our target values, at least over some time horizon.”
e Taylor rule expresses a linear trade-o between ination and output/unemployment,
of the form r = β0+β1pi+β2y where, according to the weights of equation (1), β0 = 1,
β1 = 1.5 and β2 = 0.5. e original Taylor rule is an aggregate policy rule and does not
envisage that each individual member will have a dierent ination sensitivity. But if
we allow for such individual variation we can then estimate rather than stipulate β1 and
β2 for each member. Expressed as a trade-o between ination and output concerns, we
can represent the balance of an individual member’s considerations built into the rule by
log β1
β2
. Again, for illustration, consider the original specication, log β1
β2
= log 1.5
0.5
≈ 1.
e interpretation is that an individual has a uniquely preferred proportional empha-
sis of ination versus output sensitivity.7 In order to be consistent with the ideal point
literature, where point predictions are scaled on a single le-right dimension, we use in-
ation sensitivity β1 as the numerator and β2 as the denominator. is naturally scales
members that are more sensitive to ination risks to the right of zero position as “Ina-
tion Hawks” and those to the le of the zero position as “Ination Doves.” is allows
us to systematically locate “Ination Doves” on the le of the scale, “Ination Hawks”
on the right, and to locate other actors between.
e dierent sensitivity of FOMC commiee members to ination output risks are,
of course, unobserved. With informative voting, we might be able to infer positions
(Clinton et al., 2004; Lauderdale and Clark, 2014), but because votes are relatively unin-
formative in the context of FOMC commiee meetings we need to look elsewhere for
information. We show how to get relative emphasis from the amounts of words mem-
bers deploy on ination topics versus output topics. We model the counts of words and
phrases in the ination and output topics (c1 and c2) respectively as:
[c1, c2] ∼ Binomial(pi, N) (2)
pi = P (c1 | N) (3)
N = c1 + c2 (4)
6FOMC Bluebook
7e original Taylor rule implies that deviation from the ination target is β1/β2 = 3 times more
important than the output gap.
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Topics not related to ination or output can be ignored because they give no information
about β1/β2.
Clearly there are other systematic determinants of the proportion (pi) of ination-
related speech, so while more elaborate multidimensional models are certainly possible,
we limit our aention to the mandated topics as those are the specied parameters in our
Taylor rule.8 In order to account for other (time varying) concerns, we include meeting
random eectsmt. We also assume that speakers’ positions are exchangeable and model
them as draws from a population of commiee members. ese eects provide our
position estimates.
log
pi,t
1− pi,t = a+ si +mt (5)
Interpreting unobserved terms in the logistic regression model can be motivated either
directly, as a form of ‘logit scaling’ from policy position scaling (Lowe et al., 2011), or
indirectly, by noting that that these quantities are rescaled versions of the positions
that would be estimated from automated text scaling (Slapin and Proksch, 2008) using
an association model (Goodman, 1985).9
2.1 Measurement
In theory, we could estimate ideal points using historical transcript data starting in 1993,
when the speakers became aware that their meetings were being recorded. However,
text-based ideal point estimation implicitly depends on a stable mapping between words
and phrases, and the topics they indicate. Because economic and political changes over
such a long period make this unlikely, we take a conservative approach. For example,
Acosta and Meade (2015) argue that the FOMC’s December 2008 meeting represents a
semantic break from previous statements because of changes in the federal funds rate
and the unique discussion of the asset purchases program. We restrict the sample time
period to the three most recent years for which transcripts are available, leading up to
but not including the U.S. nancial crisis.
Our unit of analysis is the speaker-meeting. We construct a speaker-meeting “doc-
ument” by concatenating each individual’s speech contributions within each FOMC
meeting for the meetings in our sample (2005-2008). Meetings are held approximately
every six weeks or eight times a year, leading to a total of twenty-four meetings, which
span two days. Each speaker speaks an average of 1,020 words per meeting across all
meetings. In this paper we focus on actors that have a formal policymaking role and
remove speeches made by sta members and other meeting participants that are either
(1) not members of the Board of Governors or (2) not Bank Presidents. We do include
in the sample members’ speech contributions even when they are not “on schedule to
vote” in the roll-call.10
8One possible concern is that as the housing crisis approaches, members might be more troubled by
housing rather than concerned with output or ination. As shown in table A.1, however, members talk
about ination eight times more than they do housing which means that adding housing as a topic will
do lile to change the results.
9See Lowe (2017) for a discussion of the connections between these approaches.
10We return to the issue of rotation voting in the section When do Members Dissent?.
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To estimate topic prevalence we use the topical n-grams model (Wang et al., 2007)
to identify those topics that central bankers talk about in FOMC meetings and to count
how oen language associated with a given topic is used.11 e n-gram topic model is
an extension of traditional LDA (Blei et al., 2003) topic model that allows for both words
and phrases to be associated with each other within topics. Specically, the model posits
an unobserved variable ‘between’ tokens indicating whether any two tokens should be
treated as a phrase in one of the topics. is allows us to account for economic phrases
such as price elasticity, which would otherwise be returned as price, and elasticity. Be-
cause many of the topics that FOMC members discuss reference underlying economic
theories and concepts with associated jargon, the use of topic phrases is particularly
helpful for organizing and classifying topics. It also allows us to infer phrases of ar-
bitrary length (i.e. ination-expectations and consumer price index are of length two
and three) and is exible enough such that word pairs and phrases in one topic are not
necessarily present in other topics (i.e. price-elasticity can belong to topic 1 and price
to topic 2).
e Gibbs sampler used to t the model draws from the posterior distribution of
topic assignments within each document.12 We use the posterior samples from the
Gibbs sampler directly to provide our counts. e use of actual topic counts rather
than normalized counts is relevant because it allows us to be more certain (or less cer-
tain) of the topic balance – and therefore position – of a speaker-meeting document
depending on its length; while the relative emphasis on ination in a speaker-meeting
“document” with seventy-ve ination-related and twenty-ve output/unemployment-
related terms is the same as one with een ination-related and ve output-related
terms, we are more certain in the rst case than the second case.
Once we have an estimate of our topic words and topic phrases, we use the topic
words and phrases generated by the n-gram topic model to identify by hand our topics
of interest. e remaining topics are discarded. In this data the most prevalent topic is
ination, with the word ination itself used 2,924 times whereas the words unemploy-
ment and output are used 245 and 260 times. e word ination alone as a word (without
its related phrases such as core ination, headline ination, and ination expectations)
accounts for 22% of the top topic words. Perhaps unsurprisingly, even Dovish central
bankers on the FOMC spend most of their time talking about ination. Table A.1 in the
Supplementary Appendix shows the top topic words and their counts for all topics.
In order to make sure that the results from the n-gram model that we use to extract
topics are robust to dierent model choices, we run the n-gram model for dierent
numbers of topics. Running the topic model for {5, 10, 25, 50} topics, we nd that
K = 25 topics are sucient to identify the topics at a suitable granularity. From our
estimated twenty-ve topics, we only keep three covering dierent aspects of output
and unemployment and one topic on ination.
We expect this topic aggregation strategy to work well when K is relatively large,
so that we have a larger number of relatively small but precisely estimated topics to
11We use a slightly adjusted version of the implementation in MALLET
12We set the iterations at 750 times. We also set the optimize-interval to ten as suggested, which turns
on hyperparameter optimization, which allows the model to beer t the data by allowing some topics
to be more prominent than others, and use the default burn-in which is twice the optimize interval. For
further details see MALLET Topic Modeling.
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aggregate. Many authors nd that statistical measures of overall model t are negatively
correlated with substantive interpretability (Chang et al., 2009), but theoretically driven
aggregation allows us to choose less biased models with good representation of our two
core theoretical concepts
To give a sense of what words and phrases are generated by the topics we label
output and ination, we show the most likely ve words and most likely ve phrases
associated with each topic:
• Output/Unemployment: productivity, compensation, energy, measured, hour,
market psychology, large trucks, lter estimate, price elasticity, weekend strains
• Ination: ination, percent, year, time, don, basis points, core ination, mone-
tary policy, ination expectations, energy prices
Allowing n-grams to be generated by topics provides considerable help for experts at-
tempting to identify which concept is captured by a topic. is is also helped by the
fact that FOMC members work with a shared technical vocabulary. e benet is a
model that distinguishes between federal reserve, federal funds rate, and federal govern-
ment, which would alternatively be returned as federal, reserve, government, funds, rate
with uni-grams, which are more ambiguous and therefore, more threatening to topic
identication.13
3 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present results from combining the topic model and the scaling model
and discuss our ndings.
Figure 2 shows the computed average estimates for each FOMC members’ ideal point
across the sample period, including meeting random eects.14 Each individual’s esti-
mate is a point prediction of their relative ination preferences from a mixed model
treating speakers as a draw from a wider population of central bankers, each with their
own intercept. us we estimate member specic reaction functions based on ination
versus employment and output emphasis. is is dierent from previous studies that
estimate each member’s implied desired federal funds rate using a xed-eect model
from implied voting decisions (Chappell et al., 2000; Bennani et al., 2018) or a spatial
model based on voting decisions (Eijnger et al., 2017). e position of each speaker’s
intercept on the x − axis measures the degree of ination aversion: that is, how will-
ing a central banker is to forgo an increase in economic activity (output and jobs) for
a reduction in ination, with those scaled on the le hand side being relatively more
Ination Dovish than those Ination Hawkish types located on the right hand side.
e results are interesting in that they conrm previous studies while oering some
important new insights. e rst, and perhaps most obviously, dissenting Bank Pres-
ident Lacker (Richmond) is estimated as having more moderate ination preferences
13Our validation checks that more counts of ination words indicates greater concern for rising (rather
than falling) ination is shown in Figure 1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
14We also estimated a model with no meeting random eects and nd similar results.
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compared to expectations based on his interest-rate tightening, dissenting, voting be-
havior. Lacker expressed ocial dissent to proposed changes to the federal funds rate a
number of times during his tenure at the Fed. In 2006, for example, during our sample
period, Lacker dissented in the August, September, October, and December meetings. In
these meetings, the FOMC agreed to keep interest rates at the status quo rate whereas
Lacker voted for additional interest rate tightening. According to vote based measures,
his persistent dissents (four times) and the call for rising rates would push him towards
to the extreme on Hawkishness. Estimates for Lacker based on implied voting, for ex-
ample, have him the farthest right on the scale for 2007 (Eijnger et al., 2017). Using
our method, while we nd Lacker to be Hawkish when we restrict the sample to only
2007, his estimated preferences for the three years place him much closer to the median.
What might explain this discrepancy? In reading the texts of the transcripts, we see
that Lacker appeals to his reputation for ination Hawkishness to discuss output and un-
employment more freely in his speech. In the December 12, 2006 meeting, for example,
which is the period right before he dissents, he says: “In past meetings I have expressed
misgivings about whether our strategy is going to bring ination down fast enough. So
I won’t belabor those again today.” His next topic is one that expresses concern about
output and unemployment in his home district. By examining voting decisions alone,
countervailing concerns, such as concerns about the economy in a member’s home dis-
trict,are subsumed by the rarity (and therefore power) of dissenting votes.
Figure 2: Estimated Fixed Ideal Points from Full Transcripts with meeting random eects
Another interesting nding is that Bank President Geithner (New York) is estimated
by our method as very Hawkish, signicantly more Hawkish than both President Lacker
and Chairman Greenspan, despite never casting a dissenting vote. is is important for
two reasons. First, as President of the New York Fed, Geithner is perhaps most likely
to represent the interests of the nancial sector than other Bank Presidents; his Hawk-
ishness may suggest that constituency eects maer. Second, President Geithner had a
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career in government before and aer being on the FOMC board. His vocational expec-
tations may also shape his preferences on ination (Eichler and La¨hner, 2014; Adolph,
2013). As the representative of the largest district, the New York Federal Reserve Bank
President always votes on the FOMC. If Geithner is a hawk, and more hawkish than the
average Bank President on the FOMC, this means that during his tenure at the FOMC,
the bias of Bank Presidents voting on the FOMC commiee was likely to be skewed
rightwards even though ination was close to or at the target rate of 2%.
Lastly, Chairman Greenspan straddles the middle position when compared against
his two successors, Chairman Bernanke and Chair Yellen. Surprisingly, Bernanke is
estimated as relatively more ination adverse than either Greenspan or Yellen, whereas
unsurprisingly, Yellen is estimated as more Dovish. Table A.2 in the Supplementary
Appendix reports the full set of static ideal point estimates for FOMC members.
3.1 Convergent Validity
Do these relative positions really uncover noticeable dierences in members’ ination
preferences as expressed in FOMC meetings? How do our measures compare with other
measures in the literature? In order to assess the validity of our measures, we rst com-
pare our measures with a subset of “expert rankings” published in the newspaper, the
Financial Times (FT) in 2009.15 Because the ranking is from 2009, the FT rankings are out
of sample (recall that our data ends in 2008). We then select and rank FOMC members
on an ordered categorical scale from 1 to 5 according to their FT labels: “Strong Dove,”
“Dove,” “Center,” “Hawk,” or “Strong Hawk.” e categories are mutually exclusive. Fig-
ure 3 shows our ordering for the eight commiee members that match across the two
samples. We nd a positive relationship between our measure and the expert rank-
ing (correlation 0.50). Both President Lacker (Richmond) and President Fisher (Dallas)
are located more to the le and mid-point in our sample compared to the FT. Another
dierence is that we estimate Chair Bernanke as being more Hawkish than the expert
ranking, who locate him closer to the midpoint.
e main point of departure between our estimate and the expert placement is with
President Fisher, and so we discuss him further. President Fisher is one of the few mem-
bers of the FOMC that dissents during his tenure on the FOMC commiee, although
he does not dissent during our sample but the following year, ve times from January
to May 2008, which is behavior likely incorporated in the FT ranking. Fisher again
dissents twice in 2011 (ornton and Wheelock, 2014). In terms of understanding the
validity of our measures for those individuals that dissent, there are two possible sce-
narios: (1) our model ignores dissenters’ positions (i.e. puts no weight on members’
voting behavior) and therefore suers from undering or (2) alternatively, the expert
ranking over-estimates members’ positions (i.e. puts too much weight on voting behav-
ior) and therefore suers from overing. Because our method can estimate members’
position irrespective of whether or not a member is on schedule to vote, our model is
more likely to accurately capture the regularities in the data and generalize well to un-
seen data. is coupled with the fact very few members dissent and do so rarely, (recall
that in our data the percentage of dissents is 2% and 10% historically) suggests that our
method is valid for uncovering most members positions on the FOMC most of the time.
15Krishna Guha, “US Federal Reserve: An eclectic aviary,” Financial Times, November 12, 2009.
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at being said, our estimate for President Fisher does lile to suggest that he will cast
a series of interest-rate tightening votes that go against the consensus of the commiee
the following year. As mentioned in the introduction, further theoretical and empirical
research explaining why we observe stark variations in how members speak and how
they vote is an interesting avenue worth exploring.
Figure 3: Comparing Estimated Fixed Ideal Points from Text with Expert Placement in
Financial Times
How do our measure compare with estimates from statistical models in the literature
rather than the expert rankings by the FT? Figure 4 presents our estimates (column 1)
alongside estimates of ideal points based on implied voting behavior by Eijnger et al.
(2017) (column 2) and estimated interest-rates by Bennani et al. (2018) (column 3), only
this time ordered according to our measure; the remaining people are those members
not included in the FT ranking but estimated in the other papers.
e most striking feature of our data compared to the other measures is that using
textual information gives us signicantly more variation across members than what is
uncovered using voting information. is is perhaps unsurprising as, the alternative
measures use voting information and central bank voting is relatively invariant. e
impact of a limited number of ocial dissents on estimated ideal points (in this case,
the preferred interest rate) is most stark in column 3, where members are, more or less,
indistinguishable from one another. To compute these measures, the authors derive
members’ policy dierentials, “or the dierence between the desired interest rate and
the Fed’s actual policy rate”16 e estimates are based on a sample of members’ vot-
ing decisions, between 1994 and 2008 (Bennani et al., 2018). Unfortunately, their dataset
does not include estimates for Fisher and Lacker, making it dicult to compare those in-
dividuals across all measures. President Yellen (San Francisco) is estimated as relatively
more hawkish than expected.
16e authors make these estimates available in their appendix Table A.2, p.8.
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Figure 4: Comparing Ideal points from Text, Implied Voting and Preferred Interest Rate
measures
Column 2 presents estimates by Eijnger et al. (2017), who use actual and implied
votes as coded from the transcripts and a Bayesian static spatial voting model over the
period 1989-2007. Because it is Bayesian, the estimated uncertainty bounds are 95%
credible intervals rather than condence intervals and the midpoint estimate are not
necessarily located in the middle.17 Comparing their estimates with column 3, one sees
the utility in including additional information in implied votes. e uncertainty on some
(but not all) of the members shrink as a consequence of more dissents. e estimate for
Yellen in column 2 compared to column 3, for example, is also much more similar to our
estimate and to the expert placement. None of the measures are well correlated, how-
ever. Our measure (column 1) is uncorrelated with the vote based (column 2) measure
(-0.06) and negatively correlated with the interest-rate measure (column 3) (-0.48). e
two vote-based measures (column 2 and column 3) are also uncorrelated (0.04). What
about if we examine the correlation with the ranking by the FT as well? Here we see
greater consistency, at least across the measures in column 1 and column 2. e corre-
lation with the FT and our text-based measure (column 1) is (0.50) and with the implied
vote measure (column 2) (0.72). Meanwhile, the interest-rate measure (column 3) is also
uncorrelated with the FT expert ranking (0.00).
3.2 Predictive Validity
is section applies our new estimates to existing ndings in the literature as a way to
demonstrate predictive validity.
17e data was generously provided by the authors.
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3.2.1 Evaluating Regional Economic Performance
One possible explanation for why central bankers have dierent preferences is they
hold preferences related to their home-districts and that their home districts have dif-
ferent economic conditions (see for e.g., Chappell et al., 2000; Bennani et al., 2018; Meade
and Sheets, 2005b). A related literature also examines whether members’ personal in-
centives, such as career motivations, are an important predictor of members’ policy
decisions. Adolph (2013), for example, examines how FOMC members might make de-
cisions today to position themselves for future employment in the nancial sector. Con-
sequently, members that anticipate future links with nance have incentives to express
more Hawkish tones while policymakers on the FOMC (see also Eichler and La¨hner,
2014).
To the best of our knowledge, while evidence for regional and professional biases
have been linked to members’ voting decisions, to date, scholars have not tested such
theories using speech data. As a rst application, we replicate these ndings by (1)
examining the correlation between the topics that FOMC members talk about and re-
gional level economic data and (2) examining whether or not members express views
consistent with lenders or borrowers in their region.
As before, the unit of analysis is speaker-meeting contributions. One way that the
sample is dierent from that above, however, is that we have to restrict the sample
to include only regional district banks and the Bank Presidents who preside over these
districts.18 To assess whether or not regional level unemployment is correlated with how
much a member talks about unemployment and output, we collect information for the
regional unemployment rate in the member’s district at the current period. As a second
measure of unemployment, we also examine one year ahead forecast unemployment.
e projections are unemployment rates as reported in the Federal Reserve Greenbook,
which are published two weeks before the FOMC meeting. Importantly, the inclusion of
forecasts from the FOMC meeting means that we use real-time (as opposed to revised)
data, which is the same as what the members themselves had at the time of the meeting.
Next, we also collect real-time current estimates of national ination, measured ac-
cording to consumer prices (CPI) and personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Sec-
ond, and like the unemployment rate, we collect CPE and PCE ination forecasts for the
current period and for one year ahead. e examination of future conditions is espe-
cially important as monetary policy has an eight to twelve month lag and so commiee
members may base their topics of speech today on expectations of future movements
in the economy (Gordon and Leeper, 1994).
Further, to reexamine the link between the nancial sector and the predicted “Hawk-
ishness” of a commiee member, we use the logged dollar amount of non-performing
loans in a member’s district as a proxy for the size of the nancial sector in the mem-
bers’ district. We think that this particular indicator is a good test as there are coun-
tervailing expectations about the size of debt and predicted Hawkishness of the Bank
President. On the one hand, high levels of non-performing loans may make Bank Presi-
dents more “Dovish.” is is because an increase in ination lowers the real (as opposed
to nominal) value of outstanding loans. If the amount of non-performing loans is nega-
18is means that members that are Governors are le out of the analysis as their constituency is
expected to be the national economy rather than their regional district.
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tively related to ination talk, we might expect that Bank Presidents lean towards repre-
senting borrowers rather than lenders in their districts. Alternatively, if the amount of
non-performing loans is negatively related (or unrelated) to Bank Presidents’ ination
talk, we might expect that Presidents with larger nancial sectors are more likely to be
Hawkish, which is more in line with the interests of lenders. Another benet of using
this particular measure is that the measure is behavioral, or dependent on the actions
of nancial actors located in the members’ district, rather than a policy measure, such
as interest rates, that the Presidents themselves have control over.
Table 1 presents our regression results. e dependent variable is the share of ina-
tion talk over output and unemployment talk. e independent variables, as discussed
above, are (a) current-period national ination; (b) current-period national unemploy-
ment; (c) the dierence between district-level unemployment and national level unem-
ployment in the current-period; (d) the log of the current level of non-performing loans;
(e) one year ahead projected national ination; and (f) one year ahead projected national
unemployment. e projections are made by sta members at the Board of Governors
two weeks before the FOMC meeting and are given to the meeting participants. e
statistical model used is a mixed-eects logistic regression model where the dependent
variable is the proportion of the raw counts expressed by each speaker at every meeting
he or she aends.
Model (1) conrms that national-level ination is positively (but not statistically sig-
nicantly) related to a greater share of ination talk. Meanwhile, national unemploy-
ment is negatively (and statistically signicantly) related to more ination talk, also as
expected. Similarly, a rise in the gap between unemployment at the district level and
at the national level is negatively related to ination; this conrms that district repre-
sentatives are sensitive to both the national economy and also their districts. In sum,
model (1) shows that when unemployment conditions move higher, either nationally or
regionally, ination talk declines.
What about when we examine the role of non-performing loans on ination and
output/unemployment speech? Here we nd that district Bank Presidents talk more
about ination when the level of non-performing loans in their district is higher. In other
words, there is a positive correlation between district-level debt and ination talk. If the
level of non-performing loans is a good proxy for the size of the nancial sector, such a
result might imply that Bank Presidents are more likely to represent creditor rather than
debtor interests in their districts. Like in model (1), model (2) continues to show that
unemployment is negatively and signicantly related to ination talk. Taken together,
this model provides further evidence that FOMC Bank Presidents act as if governed by
a Textual Taylor Rule.
Finally, model (3) examines forward looking projections of the economy rather than
conditions on the ground at the time of the FOMC meeting. In this model, we nd that
while not only is the regional unemployment gap and projected unemployment nega-
tively related with ination talk, so too is projected future ination. is is particularly
puzzling as why would projected ination be negatively related to talk about ination
today if monetary policy works only with a lag? Interestingly, the mean level of current
period ination is signicantly higher than the four quarter ahead forecast. is is true
irrespective of whether or not we examine CPI or PCE ination values. On average, the
current CPI ination average over the series (3.01) is similar to the actual average (3.4;
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3.2; 2.8) reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,19 yet, the projected one year ahead
forecast is substantively lower than the current ination values almost all of the time.
e fact that future ination is systematically predicted as being lower than current
ination is likely what is generating the negative relationship between future ination
and ination talk in model (3).
In summary, previous studies have examined the role of district-economic perfor-
mance and nancial-sector connectivity as possible predictors of central bank prefer-
ences. As with most of the previous literature, such studies omit members’ speeches.
In this application, we show how ination and unemployment are related to members
speech in accordance with a Textual Taylor Rule; members speak more about ination
when unemployment goes down as well as the reverse. We also nd that district Bank
Presidents are more likely to favor ination speech when debts in their region are in-
creasing. Such a nding suggests that Bank Presidents may beer represent the interests
of creditors rather than debtors in their districts.
3.2.2 When do Members’ Dissent?
At any given time, the total number of FOMC commiee members ocially included
in the roll call vote is twelve. ese twelve people include seven members of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank Presidents. e four Bank
Presidents serve one-year terms and voting rotates according to an agreed calendar
(i.e. members do not select themselves into any given meeting). Despite lacking voting
privileges at some (but not all) meetings, the remaining Reserve Bank Presidents aend
meetings, make economic assessment of the economy, and express their individual pol-
icy positions for both the policy rate and the ocial policy statement in the transcripts
prior to the roll call.
Using a natural experiment to analyze the eect of transparency on members’ in-
centives to dissent, Meade and Stasavage (2008) nd evidence that voting members are
much less likely to dissent than non-voting members. We retest this nding using our
data, taking into account a member’s estimated ideal point from text as well as whether
the member is on schedule to vote or not. If we nd that members behave dierently
with their speech and with their votes when on schedule to vote, we can assume that
voting and non-voting members have dierent audiences. Recall that while voting de-
cisions are made readily available, publication of transcripts are with a 5 year lag.
Following the procedure by Meade and Stasavage (2008), using the transcripts, we
code dissent as a binary measure based on whether a policymaker voiced disagreement
with the Chair’s policy proposal during the policy debate before the formal roll-call vote.
Further, to take a more generous measure of “dissent,” we code a member as dissenting
even if the member expresses dissent only in speech and not in the roll call; this gives us
a larger number of dissents to work with (32 vs. 7). Furthermore, instead of just looking
at dissenting votes that protest changes in the policy interest rate, we also examine
whether members propose changes to the ocial policy statement which is publicized
aer the decision; this includes an even larger number of dissents (118 out of 425 total).
Following Meade and Stasavage (2008), we expect a negative relationship between those
19Bureau of Labor Statistics Ination
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members on rotation to vote and expressing a dissenting opinion, regardless of their
policy position. e rationale is that consent is more likely expressed by voting members
due to strategic incentives to minimize economic and policy uncertainty that results
from dissenting opinions.
We test this hypothesis by regressing dissent on member ideal points and voting
status, with meeting random eects to control for over-time changes in the economy.
e results are shown in Table 2. Model (1) predicts dissent over the policy interest rate,
and model (2) predicts dissent over the text of the ocial policy statement.
Table 2: Predicting Dissents in Policy Rates and Policy Statements with Ideal Points and
Voting Status
Dependent variable:
Dissent Policy Rate Dissent Statement
(1) (2)
est −0.063 −0.145
(0.153) (0.089)
vote −0.738∗ −0.753∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.243)
Constant −2.610∗∗∗ −0.650∗∗
(0.424) (0.256)
Observations 405 403
Log Likelihood -100.618 -222.952
Akaike Inf. Crit. 209.236 453.904
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 225.252 469.900
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
We nd evidence in support of the hypothesis that the rotation system engenders
consensus opinion among those members on schedule to vote. is conrms theories
arguing that ocial voting behavior likely reects strategic behavior towards coordi-
nation in addition to the expression of policy positions.20 Our ndings suggest that
being on schedule to vote makes you less likely to dissent across both categories (i.e.
strategic voting). We also nd that being more ination Hawkish makes you less likely
to dissent to the policy statement, however, this is not statistically signicant. So, ac-
cording to these results, members’ voting position (on rotation or o rotation) helps
predict whether or not a member will dissent, thus suggesting strategic rather than
20In a separate analysis, we also compare members’ estimated positions from the full meeting and
positions from the economic-go around when members report on their district and where members can
request when to speak (at the start, middle, or end) – thus allowing for strategic behavior. We nd no
evidence that members take on dierent positions within a meeting. Results are available upon request
from the authors.
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sincere voting.
4 Conclusion
is article shows the usefulness in combining topic and scaling methods to estimate
central bank policy positions. We develop a new way to estimate central bank prefer-
ences on the FOMC based on topics that commiee members are mandated to talk about.
We extract topic-counts from commiee meeting transcripts and compute relative topic
emphasis to help identify dierences in actors’ policy positions. Our main contribution
is that we oer an estimate of FOMC members’ preferences based on private policy
deliberations that occur before members agree (or disagree) to coordinate their policy
actions by roll-call voting and we do so for all members, irrespective if they are on cycle
to vote or not. By using textual information as data to help uncover each members’ rel-
ative ination emphasis, we oer ideal-point estimates based on a members’ professed
ination aversion.
We show greater variation in FOMC members’ preferences than what we see in vot-
ing behaviors. is supports recent evidence in other domains where researchers also
uncover greater variation in speech than in votes. We also nd that by only analyz-
ing voting data, researchers likely overemphasize a dissenter’s dissimilarity with his or
her colleagues. is laer point is especially important because both researchers and
market participants use voting behavior to predict changes in key interest rates. One
fruitful item for further research, therefore, is to examine whether there exists an simi-
lar relationship between dissents in speech and votes and changes to key interest rates.
It is not clear whether the pathway of expressed dissent goes from speech to votes or if
these two policy behaviors are independent. Do commiee members start o making
verbal protests in private only to build up to ocial dissent or do policymakers use these
two behaviors so as to satisfy dierent goals?
Finally, our results also provide important policy implications. e Bank of England
recently changed its procedures and will make permanent recordings and transcripts of
Monetary Policy Commiee meetings (Warsh, 2014). While some have warned that by
doing so, commiee members may stie their debate, our ndings suggest that publi-
cation of the meetings need not stie diversity in deliberations amongst members.
Moving away from the FOMC and central banking, our approach also provides an
important tool for researchers that are interested in estimating actors’ preferences in po-
litical institutions where expressed dissents are rare. As we show in this paper, matching
human judgment with unsupervised learning techniques allows us to estimate mem-
bers’ preferences despite the fact that institutional norms encourage consensus deci-
sions. Our approach can be directly applied to any type of political institution with a
dual mandate. For example, those interested in bureaucratic politics might look to spe-
cic agencies, such as the U.S. Housing and Urban Development, and determine how the
agency prioritizes low-income housing versus mortgage insurance. At the international
level, another application might be the Stability and Growth Pact, where Member States
commit themselves to staying within certain debt and decit spending limits. Here one
might examine whether dierent EU Member States prioritize one scal limit over the
other.
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